Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Debra Lynn Martineau v. Elliot J. anderson and
Mary Christine anderson : Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
MAX D. WHEELER, CRAIG STEPHENS COOK; ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
APPELLANTPHILIP R. FISHLER, JR.; ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS- RESPONDENTS
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Martineau v. Anderson, No. 16923 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2205

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEBRA LYNN MARTINEAU,
PlaintiffAppellant,

)
)

vs.

No. 16923

ELLIOT J. ANDERSON and
MARY CHRISTINE ANDERSON,
DefendantsRespondents.

)

)

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment
of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County
The Honorable Jay E. Banks
District Judge

MAX WHEELER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
CRAIG S. COOK
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
PHIL FISHLER
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants-

Respondents

FIl ED
JUN - 5 1981

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of~--------------~-~-·-----------------·--~·
Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEBRA LYNN MARTINEAU,
PlaintiffAppellant,

)
)
)

vs.

)

ELLIOT J. ANDERSON and
MARY CHRISTINE ANDERSON,
DefendantsRespondents.

No. 16923

)
)
)

)

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment
of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County
The Honorable Jay E. Banks
District Judge

MAX WHEELER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. o. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
CRAIG S. COOK
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
PHIL FISHLER
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENT
POINT I -- THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
FILING A VERDICT WHICH IS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT, NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE, AND WHICH SHOWS JURY CONFUSION OR MISCONDUCT ••••••••••••••••••••••••.

1

POINT II -- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE
THE VERDICT FORMS BEFORE THEY WERE
RESUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND BEFORE
THE JURY WAS DISMISSED AND PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL DID NOT WAIVE ANY DEFECT IN
THE FORM OF THE VERDICT.......................

6

POINT III -- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF A NEW
TRIAL IN THAT THE JURY AWARDED
INADEQUATE DA.MAGES NOT BASED UPON
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL

9

.........

POINT IV -- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO DIRECT LIABILITY AGAINST
DEFENDANT SINCE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
TO SHOW A FACTUAL QUESTION OF LIABILITY
FOR THE JURY • . • • . • • • . • • • • . • • • . . . . • . • • • • . • • • • •

11

CONCLUSION • . • • . . • . • • • • . • . • . • • . • • • • • • . • . . . . . • . • . • . • • .

12

CASES CITED
Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d 451 (Utah 1966)

5

Weeks v. Calderwood (Utah, January 25,
19 7 9 , No • 15 6 71 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------OEBRA LYNN MARTINEAU,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
ELLIOT J. ANDERSON
and MARY CHRISTINE
ANDERSON I

No. 16923

DefendantsRespondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
FILING A VERDICT WHICH IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT,
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND WHICH SHOWS
JURY CONFUSION OR MISCONDUCT.
Respondents in their brief have made numerous assPrtions
and speculations which are not supported by the facts of this
case.

In addition, respondents' authorities do not assist them

in the peculiar problem which occurred in this verdict.
Respondents admit that the Jorgenson v. Gonzales case
cited by both parties requires a court to resubmit a verdict
to a jury if it appears irregular on its face.

Naturally,

Appellant agrees with this characterization of the Jorgenson
case by Respondents.
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In the instant
case there were three irregularities
.
;

...

~

appearing on the form of the first verdict which were reviewed
solely by the trial judge and not with counsel for either party.
First, the verdict form awarded zero general damages and
$940 special damages.

The court noted this problem and in-

structed the jury that it had to assess general damages
when special damages were found.
Second, however, the special damage section stated:
"$20 annually for 47 years -- total $940."

This clearly

should have alerted the lower court that the jury misconstrued
the nature of special damages and a further instruction or
direction as to this problem should also have been given.
It should be noted from the Affidavit of Mr. Wheeler, plaintiff's attorney, that such a request was made by him and
rejected by the lower court.

(Supplemental record.)

Third, the total shown on the verdict form was $1,144
whereas the total of general damages equally zero and·
special damages equalling $940 obviously did not compute
to this grand total. Thus, the deficiency appeared as to whether
the missing $204 was allotted as special damages or as general
damages.

Again, the court failed to make any instruction or

comment upon this error.
Respondents incorrectly state the contents of the first
verdict.

Respondents say, "The jury did make an error in

form, however.

The $204 should have remained in the special

damages category with the $940 being removed to the general
damage section."

(Respondents' brief, pp. 11-12).

And again
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Respondents state, "The verdict form shows the amounts
awarded to each category was merely switched; the $204
being put in the_general damages rather than the special
damages.

This would leave the $940 as a compensation for

some future general damages.''

(Respondents' brief, p.

12) •

An examination of the first verdict form clearly shows
that Respondents' statements are in error.
verdict form returned by the jury showed

The original

~

general damages and $940 as special damages.

dollars as
The $204

spoken of by Respondents was not listed as a general damage
and was not listed specifically in any way.

Only by sub-

tracting $940 from the total could this figure be computed.
However, it is just as likely that the $204 figure was intended
as special damages but at that it had not been specifically
listed with the $940.
In this instance, therefore, the jury could just as easily
have intended to award $1,144 in special damages and zero
dollars in general damages.

In such a case an obvious error

occurs since there are no general damages awarded and all damages
are listed as special damages.

This verdict is clearly insuffi-

cient under Utah law.
The second alternative is to assume that the $204 was
meant by the jury to be general damages.

Under this theory,

the jury corrected the second verdict form to reflect their
intention.

They therefore listed $204 as general damages and

$9.40 as special damages with the explanation that this money
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was $20 annualiy for 47 years.

Since the jury obviously

was confused as to this $940 it should have been properly
placed in the general damage section.

In this instance,

then, the $1144 would have been general damages with no
award being made for special damages.

Because Plaintiff

produced uncontroverted medical testimony as to the expenses
she incurred as a result of the accident, the failure to
award any special damages would also have been insufficient
under Utah law.
~s

in the Brown case cited by Respondents (Respondents'

brief, p. 10), the jury was obviously confused or did not
understand the difference between the terms ''general damages"
and "special damages."

While in Brown, the jury was able to

correct this misunderstanding after being informed by the
trial court as to the eLror, in the instant case the jury was
still confused and still misunderstood its obligation to
separate the damages as is evidenced by the second jury
verdict form.
This is not a case similar to those cited by Respondents
from the Supreme Court of Oregon.
14-15; 17-19).

(Respondents' brief, pp.

In both the Moore and Locatelli cases, it was

impossible for the court to ascertain whether the damages had
been correctly characterized by the jury since only the figures
themselves were listed in the verdict forms.

Appellant does

not dispute the proposition that when special damages are
susceptible to conflicting evidence and where general damages
are also subject to conflicts that the jury is free to arrive
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at any figure it desires to compensate the plaintiff.
See also Weeks v. Calderwood, (Utah, January 25, 1979,
No. 15671).

In this case, however, there is no question that the
jury misconstrued special damages with general damages,
as evidenced by the notation concerning the 47 years annuity.
Had the amounts themselves been inserted at $204 and $940
it would have been only speculative for this Court or the parties
to ascertain how the amounts were arrived at on the verdict form.
But when the comments of the jury obviously show

a

direct

misconception of the court's instructions the verdict is on
its face insufficient and requires correction.

Jorgenson, supra.

In summary, therefore, it is appellant's contention that
the three errors made on the face of the first verdict form
and the one error made on the face of the second verdict form
showed that the jury did not understand the general - special
damage distinction and that it is only speculation on the
part of Respondents and Appellant as to what the jury believed
or disbelieved in the evidence.
To say that the jury would have reached the same result
had it understood the distinction in damages is as speculative
and unsupported as for Appellant to say that the jury would
have reached a different result had it understood the court's
instructions.

Since it cannot be said that this confusion

would have resulted in the same verdict and would be harmless
error, a new trial must be ordered by this Court to correct
this extremely prejudicial error.

Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d

451 (Utah 1966).
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO·GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO
EXAMINE THE VERDICT FORMS BEFORE THEY
WERE RESUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND BEFORE
THE JURY WAS DISMISSED AND PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL DID NOT WAIVE ANY DEFECT IN THE
FORM OF THE VERDICT.
Respondents assert that Plaintiff's counsel waived any
defect in the jury form by not objecting to it at the time it
was delivered.

As noted in Appellant's brief, in chief, there

is no doubt that an attorney for a client can waive an irregularit
in the verdict form if a proper objection is not timely made.
However, the facts in the instant case and those in the Langton
and Cohn cases are decidedly different.
In the instant case the record shows that when the verdict
was returned the trial court examined it, determined it was
insufficient, and called counsel to a side-bar conference.
(~r.

236-237).

not reported.

As is typical in Utah courts, the conference was
It is undisputed, however, that the trial court

did not offer to show the verdict to either counsel. The jury
was then told that special damages could not be awarded in the
absence of general damages and told to deliberate once again.
(~r.

237).

Mr. Wheeler's suggestion for a further instruction

on special and general damages was rejected by the court.
fSupplernental record) •
Five minutes later the new verdict was returned and the
court stated that the verdict could be published.

The record

shows that " the verdict was published by the clerk and the
jury was Polled."

{Tr. 238).

Plaintiff contends that at
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the time the clerk read the jury verdict the language referring
to the annuity was omitted.
verdict and ordered it filed.

The court then received

the

It then excused the jury and

it was not until this point that the actual form was shown
to Plaintiff's counsel.
Thus, since Respondents do not dispute the manner of reading
the verdict by the clerk it can be assumed for purposes of this
appeal that the verdict form was read without the annuity language contained in the special damage section.

Without hearing

this language Plaintiff's counsel had no way of knowing that
the jury had incorrectly placed an item of general damages in
the special damage section, thereby making the verdict erroneous
on its face and erroneous for failing to find any special
damages.
In both Langton and Cohn there was no question raised that
the attorney representing the plaintiff was aware of the
exact language contained in the verdict form.

In both not only

did plaintiffs' counsel receive the verdict form before the
jury was dismissed but the trial court specifically asked
plaintiffs' counsel if there was anything further counsel
wished to bring before the court.
In the instant case, however, Plaintiff's counsel properly
assumed that the verdict form as read by the clerk contained
all of the information written by the jury.

When the clerk

failed to read the critical language concerning the annuity
it can hardly be said that Plaintiff's counsel waived an
opportunity to object to the form of the verdict.
Since a heavy burden is placed upon counsel at the time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a verdict is returned and since a waiver can easily be
assessed again~t the counsel's client, it is Appellant's
position that this Court should formulate a rule in the
state of Utah making it mandatory for the trial court to
allow both counsel to examine the verdict form before it is
read by the clerk and entered by the court.
Such a rule would allow counsel to bring to the court's
attention any error in the verdict form before the verdict is
entered and would clearly establish that counsel was aware of
the exact language contained in the form and therefore that
any irregularity was waived.
In the alternative, this Court should formulate a requirement that the court reporters of the state report the exact
language read by the clerk when the verdict is being published
and that the trial court, as in Cohn, specifically give counser
an opportunity to bring matters before the court while the jury
is still empaneled.
It is obvious that in any type of a "waiver" situation
it is fundamental that the party who is waiving his right
must know of the rights which he is waiving.

In the absence

of being able to see the entire scheme of the first and second
verdict and being able to see the comments made by the jury
it cannot be said that Plaintiff's counsel waived any _defect
in the form.

On the other hand, the lower court which saw

both the first and second verdict allowed the verdict to be
published when it contained an obvious defect on its face which
should have required resubmission to the jury and clarification
to the jury as to general and special damages.
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It is fun~amentally unfair to forgive a lower court
for its errors in allowing an erroneous verdict to be
entered and punishing the attorneys for failure to bring
such errors to the court's attention while at the same time
not requiring the court to give the counsel a sufficient
opportunity to examine the verdict and make the proper objections
before the jury is excused.
For this reason, Appellant respectfully suggests that the
failure to show counsel the two verdict forms at the time they
were entered constituted error in this case and that a new rule
should be formulated for all future cases in the state of
Utah to prevent similar confusion and injustice.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO· GRANT
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE JURY AWARDED
INADEQUATE DAMAGES NOT BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL.
Respondents again resort to the familiar rule that the
jury is entitled to weigh the evidence in arriving at damages
for both special and general compensation.
has no disagreement with this rule.

Again, Appellant

The corollary to this

rule is, however, that when damages are undisputed the failure
of a jury to award such damages constitutes an inadequate verdict.
While Respondents have conveniently placed the $204 in
the special damage section by claiming that the jury became
confused between general and special damages, as stated
previously, there is no evidence except the speculation of
Respondents that the jury intended the $204 to be special
rather than general damages.

Since in the first verdict the
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jury found zer9 general damages it is more likely that the
jury intended all $1144 to be special damages.

In the

second verdict, however, when i t placed the $204 in the general
damage section the jury obviously intended this amount of money
to be included as general damages.

Thus, if the $940 should have

been included in the general damage section the result is
simply that the $1,144 is deemed all general damages with no
special damages.
A review of the evidence shows that even under the light
most favorable to the defendants, Plaintiff incurred both
medical expenses and loss of wages due to the accident.

To

find no special damages whatsoever is clearly an error on the
part of the jury.

This Court will note that many of the medical

bills which were incurred by Plaintiff were completely undisputed I
by defendants as to their reasonableness and as to their connection with the accident.

The jury was therefore not free to

find no special damages whatsoever as to this undisputed evidence.
Finally, it should be again observed that the "47 year
annuity at $20 a year" was a calculation arrived at entirely by
the jury since neither side ever presented any similar type
of evidence.

This figure and calculation again points out the

confusion on the part of the jury in making its damage award.
For these reasons, therefore, if the verdict form is
construed as it must be with all general damages and no special
damages it is apparent that the damage award for specials was
totally inadequate and would require a reversal on this point
alone.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL. COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DT-RECT
LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT SINCE THERE WAS
NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW A FACTUAL QUESTION OF
LIABILITY FOR THE JURY.
Respondents take a seemingly contradictory position in
their brief.

(Respondents' brief, p. 31-33).

On the one

hand they assert that since the jury found in favor of
Plaintiffs and against Defendants as to liability that no
error occurred by the failure of the court to direct liability
against Defendants.

On the other hand, however, they claim

that this case should not be submitted back to the lower court
as to damages only since the new jury "would not have all of
the evidence before them and be able to see all the weaknesses
of the plaintiff's position."
Thus, Respondents admit that the question of liability
and the evidence adduced at trial concerning liability can
directly or indirectly affect an award of damages.
If a plaintiff becomes confused as to the dates or events
leading to a sequence of an automobile accident and therefore
makes a poor witness on his or her own behalf as to the liability
portion of a trial it is probable that a jury would conclude
that the witness's testimony concerning damages is equally
implausible.

In effect, then, when a plaintiff is entitled

to a directed verdict as a matter of law the failure to direct
such a verdict places the plaintiff in jeopardy of not only having
the jury erroneously decide liability but also having the damage
portion of the verdict affected.
In the instant case there is no better example of when a
directed verdict should be granted than where a passenger is the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-11OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff and is suing another driver.

Why the trial court

failed to direct a verdict on behalf of Plaintiff remains
a mystery.

However, the testimony of Plaintiff relating to

liability and her fuzzy memory concerning distances, time,
and events could have affected the jury's determination as
to her credibility concerning her damages.
It cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the
liability portion of this trial did not affect the damage portion
by, as Respondents as stated, allowing the jury to see "all
the weaknesses of the plaintiff's position."

As such it was

prejudicial error to require liability testimony in such a
clearcut case mandating a directed verdict.
CONCLUSION
The jury verdict form in this case is unique.

Whereas

most incorrect forms contain one error the instant case contained three initial errors.

While the lower court corrected

one it failed to correct the other two and the verdict form
as finally entered by the trial court contains a glaring error
showing that the jury misconstrued the court's instructions
as to special and general damages.
Since Plaintiff's counsel only heard that portion of the
verdict read which is not inconsistent on its face and since
the court did not allow Plaintiff's counsel any opportunity
to examine the verdict form before excusing the jury, it
cannot be said that plaintiff waived the objection to such form.
On the contrary, this case illustrates the need to formulate
a rule allowing counsel the "opportunity" to examine a verdict
so that a waiver can either be properly asserted or so that
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counsel can correct an error before the jury is excused.
Since it must be assumed that the jury awarded all
general damages and no special damages the failure to find such
special damages is clearly inadequate since the undisputed
evidence showed that Plaintiff incurred both medical expenses
and lost wages as a direct result of this accident.
Finally, the failure to direct a verdict on behalf of
plaintiff was not harmless error in that the liability
portion of the trial could easily have affected the damage
award given to Plaintiff.
For these reasons, therefore, this case should be remanded
for new trial as to damages only.
MAX D. WHEELER, ESQ.
and
CRAIG S. COOK, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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